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30Abstract
This paper develops a model to explain the determinants of ¯nan-
cial dollarization. Expanding on the existing literature, our framework
allows interest rate di®erentials to play a role in explaining ¯nancial
dollarization. It also accounts for the increasing presence of foreign
banks in the local ¯nancial sector. Using a newly compiled data set
on transition economies we ¯nd that increasing access to foreign funds
leads to higher credit dollarization, while it decreases deposit dollar-
ization. Interest rate di®erentials matter for the dollarization of both
loans and deposits. Overall, the empirical results lend support to the
predictions of our theoretical model.
JEL classi¯cation: E44, G21




Working Paper Series No 748 
May 2007Non-technical summary
Why do households and ¯rms in many countries borrow in foreign currencies?
Why do they hold deposits in foreign currencies? This paper addresses these
questions theoretically and empirically using a newly compiled data set on
transition economies, a region which has not been traditionally the focus of
the so-called \¯nancial dollarization" literature. This lack of attention by the
literature is all the more surprising given that ¯nancial dollarization is indeed
prevalent, and in some cases growing, among the formerly planned economies.
Financial dollarization increases the exposure of agents to exchange rate risk
and can therefore become a potential source of macroeconomic and ¯nancial
instability. Hence, understanding the determinants of ¯nancial dollarization
is of great interest not only to researchers but also to policy-makers. Data
availability and the lack of an overall theoretical framework have hitherto
been the main constraints to improving our understanding of ¯nancial dol-
larization. In this paper we contribute to the literature both theoretically
and empirically.
On the theory of ¯nancial dollarization, we expand on the existing lit-
erature by modeling explicitly how competition among banks, and the fact
that banks often have an open facility to increase funds by accumulating for-
eign liabilities, may a®ect local currency and foreign currency interest rate
di®erentials. The feature that banks can accumulate foreign liabilities is
motivated by the widespread experience in the transition countries, where
many banks are now subsidiaries of foreign banks and have ample access to
foreign sources of funding from their parent banks. Introducing imperfect
competition in the banking market and letting banks borrow abroad to fund
domestic credit growth allows us to incorporate a departure from uncovered
interest rate parity. We are therefore able to address the common argument
that interest rate di®erentials between loans in foreign and local currency are
a key factor behind credit dollarization. This is an argument which cannot
be addressed within theoretical frameworks such as the so-called minimum
variance portfolio approach, which assumes that the uncovered interest rate
parity holds and explains ¯nancial dollarization as a portfolio choice prob-
lem in which agents choose the currency composition of their portfolio that
minimizes the variance of returns (local currency assets have uncertain re-
turns due to domestic in°ation and foreign currency assets have uncertain
due to real exchange rate risk). Recognizing the important insights from the
minimum variance portfolio approach our modeling strategy is to nest the
minimum variance portfolio approach and expand on it.
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data set on ¯nancial dollarization in transition economies and use it to test
the main predictions of our model. Our data set shows that dollarization
of deposits is not generally matched by the dollarization of credit - a result
which is di±cult to square with some of the existing theories of ¯nancial
dollarization but is consistent with our framework. In particular, it ¯ts with
the argument that foreign borrowing by banks is being used to fund domestic
credit growth. As banks have to keep net open positions under a limit, they
go on to lend in foreign currency to domestic borrowers and we observe a
rise in credit dollarization without deposit dollarization being necessarily
a®ected. Our data set is also particularly rich in terms of the availability of
data split on credit and deposit dollarization split for households and ¯rms.
The main predictions of the model are con¯rmed in our empirical analysis as
follows:
First, access to foreign funds increases credit dollarization but it decreases
the dollarization of deposits. The underlying intuition is the access of banks
to foreign borrowing, often from their parent banks, as already mentioned.
This implies that the accumulation of foreign liabilities seen in transition
countries results in currency mismatches in the agents' portfolios in these
countries.
Second, interest rate di®erentials matter. As expected in our model, a
wider interest rate di®erential on loans in domestic currency compared to
loans in foreign currency increases loan dollarization. A wider interest rate
di®erential on deposits (again local currency interest rate minus foreign cur-
rency interest rate) has a negative e®ect on the extent of deposit dollarization.
Third, in line with the literature on the minimum variance portfolio ap-
proach, the trade o® between in°ation and real exchange rate variability is
found to be a signi¯cant factor explaining ¯nancial dollarization.
Fourth, a higher degree of openness of an economy contributes to loan
dollarization - but it appears to do so only in the case of ¯rms and not house-
holds. In general the explanatory power of our model is lower for household
dollarization, calling for more research e®orts particularly in that area.
Overall, our analysis provides both a theoretical motivation as well as
empirical validation that the access of banks to foreign funds and interest
rate di®erentials between local and foreign currency instruments a®ect the
extent of ¯nancial dollarization in transition economies.
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Why do households and ¯rms in many countries borrow in foreign curren-
cies? Why do they hold deposits in foreign currencies? This paper addresses
these questions theoretically and empirically using a newly compiled data
set on transition economies, a region which has not been traditionally the
focus of the so-called \¯nancial dollarization" (FD) literature. As noted in
a recent survey, this lack of attention by the literature is all the more sur-
prising given that FD is indeed prevalent, and in some cases growing, among
the formerly planned economies (Levy-Yeyati (2006)). Moreover, high ex-
change rate exposure has been recently highlighted as a potential source of
macroeconomic and ¯nancial instability in a number of central and south-
east European economies (Winkler and Beck (2006), Standard and Poor's -
RatingsDirect (2006)).
Until recently, the literature on FD (de¯ned as the holding by residents of
a share of their assets and/or liabilities denominated in foreign currency) has
lacked both an overall encompassing framework as well as a broad empirical
basis. Lack of data has led to the literature often focusing on either deposit
or credit dollarization but typically not both (e.g. Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize
(2005)). Having a broader view is important because theoretical explanations
can often help to explain the dollarization of deposits but not credit, or the
other way around. If, for example, agents perceived the currency to be
overvalued, assumption that the literature usually does, then the safe heaven
portfolio approach can only explain why households hold deposits in foreign
currency but not why they are borrowing in foreign currency.
In a recent survey of the literature, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2005) divide
the main contributions to the theoretical analysis of FD into three main
paradigms: (a) the price risk-portfolio choice; (b) credit risk; and, (c) ¯-
nancial environment. The portfolio choice approach, as its name suggests,
explains FD as the result of a portfolio choice by which agents minimize
the variance of the portfolio returns. Returns of local currency assets are
uncertain due to domestic in°ation while returns of foreign currency assets
are uncertain due to real exchange rate risk. This approach focuses on vari-
ances since any interest rate di®erentials are assumed to be cancelled out by
expected exchange rate movements, thus the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) holds. The credit risk paradigm explains FD as the result of optimal
decisions by risk neutral agents in the presence of default risk (enhanced
by moral hazard/asymmetric information) while the ¯nancial environment
7
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tions.
It is, however, di±cult to ¯nd unequivocal empirical support for any of
the above paradigms as the three explanations overlap to some extent (a sig-
ni¯cant variable in explaining FD could be linked to two or even all theories).
This calls for a uni¯ed analytical framework. Ize (2005) provides one such
approach based on an investor/household sector that decides on its deposits
based on the minimum variance portfolio choice paradigm, while risk neutral
¯rms choose the currency composition of their borrowing in the presence of
default risk. The results are obtained based on the assumption that there
might exist an overvaluation overhang due to the fact that governments do
not adjust the exchange rate within a speci¯c interval.
Two key aspects of Ize (2005) should be highlighted. Firstly, contrary
to most other contributions, which look at FD only from the depositors
side,1 Ize's model explains both deposit and credit dollarization. Depositors
(households) choose foreign currency denominated assets motivated by the
\safe heaven" portfolio (dollar denominated assets are one sided bets) while
borrowers (¯rms) choose foreign currency denominated loans to maximize
their objective function in the presence of default risk. Secondly, despite
this separation of the motives of investors and ¯rms, the model requires
the equilibrium to be de¯ned as a point where depositors and borrowers
choose the same currency composition. This implies that banks are mere
intermediaries without any in°uence in the ¯nal outcome and interest rates
are fully determined by the interaction between investors and ¯rms.
However, the assumption that credit and deposit dollarization are always
matched is not broadly supported by our data. In transition economies, on
which we focus our empirical analysis, the shares of foreign currency loans
and foreign currency deposits are often negatively correlated (see Table 5
below). Credit dollarization has increased in these economies as banks in
the region, often foreign-owned, have been able to borrow abroad to fund a
substantial growth of domestic credit which - to keep the banks' exposures
matched - is granted in foreign currencies (see also Arcalean and Calvo-
Gonzalez (2006)). Subsidiaries of foreign owned banks are often seen as
driving the fast credit growth in their attempt to capture market shares
1A relevant exception is Barajas and Morales (2003) who analysed, empirically, Dollar-
ization of Liabilities (DL) in Latin America ¯nding that Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Market interventions and interest rate di®erential (interpreted as representing borrowers
market power) are also important factors driving DL.
8
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are also expected to grow substantially in the medium term.2 Therefore, in
explaining FD it is important to model explicitly two key features: (i) the
di®erent extent to which dollarization a®ects credit and deposits; (ii) the role
that competition among banks is playing in driving foreign currency lending
in these countries.
The latter has been addressed empirically in transition economies only
by Luca and Petrova (2003), who concluded that banks, in attempting to
match currency composition of their assets and liabilities, drive FD in these
economies. To our knowledge only Catao and Terrones (2000) provide a
theoretical model of FD focused on the banking side. However, the loans
and deposits decisions are not explicitly modeled, ad hoc loan demand func-
tions are assumed while deposits are in in¯nite supply given a deposit rate.
Moreover, foreign and local currency loans are not considered as substitutes.
In their model FD is determined not only by the interest rate set by the
banks but mostly by the assumption that investors have di®erent collateral
capabilities. Therefore, despite its novelty, the model does not allow one to
isolate the impact of market and legal imperfections and banking activity on
FD. Finally, their framework does not provide simple testable implications,
limiting its use in empirical work.
As in Ize (2005) we model depositors and borrowers separately. In our
basic framework, we do so by assuming that households have di®erent dis-
count factors, one being a borrower and one a lender. This contrasts to Ize's
approach in which he assumes that ¯rms are borrowers and households are
lenders. However, in one extension to our model we also include ¯rms that
borrow funds to ¯nance investment opportunities.
Our main contribution to the literature is to model explicitly how compe-
tition among banks, and the fact that banks have an open facility to increase
funds by accumulating foreign liabilities, may a®ect local currency and for-
eign currency interest rate di®erentials. Crucially, we introduce imperfect
competition in the banking market and allow foreign liabilities to be used in
2For evidence of the importance of targets for future market shares for foreign-owned
banks active in the region such as ING and Rai®eisen see de Haas and Naaborg (2005).
Recently, the high price at which a 62 percent stake in the Romanian bank BCR was sold
(EUR 3.75 billion - the largest amount ever paid for a central and eastern European bank)
was interpreted by market commentators as driven by the fact that BCR represented the
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ered interest rate parity. We would therefore be able to address the common
argument that interest rate di®erentials between loans in foreign and local
currency are a key factor behind credit dollarization - an argument which
by construction cannot be addressed within the minimum variance portfolio
approach alone.
The main predictions of the model, which are indeed con¯rmed in our em-
pirical results, are as follows. First, access to foreign funds increases credit
dollarization but it decreases dollarization of deposits. Hence the increasing
foreign presence in the banking sector coupled with accumulation of bank-
ing foreign liabilities experienced in transition economies results in currency
mismatches in the agents' portfolios in these countries. Second, interest rate
di®erentials matters. A wider interest rate di®erencial on loans positively
a®ects loan dollarization. Interest rate di®erential on deposits has a negative
e®ect on deposit dollarization. Third, our results con¯rm the relevance of the
minimum variance portfolio theory of dollarization. Fourth, higher degree of
openness leads to higher corporate loan dollarization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
model of the currency choice while section 3 provides solutions and model im-
plications. An overview of the data and methodology is presented in section
4, section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 concludes. Auxil-
iary regression results and an alternative model speci¯cation are presented
in the appendix.
2 Model
Assume the economy is populated by an in¯nite number of banks i 2 [0;1],
two representative households and a deposits and loans Dixit-Stiglitz CES
\aggregator". We assume that all economic agents live for two periods. As
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Each representative household has a speci¯c discount factor, household H has
¯H and household L has ¯L < ¯H. Both households have identical endow-
ments in both periods (Y )3, hence the relationship between the interest rate
charged by banks and their implicit interest rate (1=¯j) determines whether
the household j = H;L decides to take a loan or make a deposit.
In equilibrium (formally stated below) the economies' gross interest rates
will be between 1=¯H and 1=¯L. Note that due to imperfect competition in
the banking market there will be two rates, one for deposits and another for
loans, for each currency. We will assume a set of parameter values for which
all four equilibrium rates will be inside that interval. Hence the household
with low discount factor will ¯nd it better to borrow and consume more today
and the other will ¯nd it better to save and consume more tomorrow. That
way a household that makes deposits (loans) does not take loans (deposits).
Households maximize utility given a stream of income choosing the amount
of deposits and loans in local and foreign currency (implicitly determining
consumption in each period). Both local and foreign currency denominated
assets are risky. While the ¯rst might °uctuate due to in°ation, the second
will °uctuate due to changes in the real exchange rate.
In order to incorporate competition among banks having only two rep-
resentative households we assume that households (indirectly through the
\aggregator") choose CES deposits and loans indexes, which are a composite
of all banks deposits and loans given a constant elasticity of substitution4.
That way the banking sector will be characterized by monopolistic compe-
tition. Although we do not model why banks exist and where they derive
their market power from, banks may be providing liquidity and hence reduc-
ing the cost of credit (Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet 2000). The assumption
that banks have market power is supported by empirical evidence (Simons
and Stavins 1998).
Each household is split into two units: (i) the investor, responsible for
deciding demand for loans and deposits5 or the set (D, L), where D = total
deposits, L = total loans and (ii) the fund manager, responsible for deciding
3Endowments, as consumption, total deposits and loans, are in real terms. This does
not a®ect the results of the model. Households may actually have unlimited access to an
exchange rate spot market in each period.
4We assume the same elasticity of substitution for loans and deposits. Allowing for
di®erent elasticity of substitution would not change the results of the model.
5Throughout the paper we state that households demand loans and deposits, consid-
11
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currency (deposit dollarization) and ®l = portion of loans in foreign currency
(loan dollarization). This speci¯cation integrates the Minimum Variance
Portfolio framework developed by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003). An alternative
speci¯cation where households make their decisions at once, rather than ¯rst
about the demand for loans and deposits and then about their currency
composition, is presented in Appendix A. As it is shown there the results are
very similar.
The investor part of the household solves a certainty equivalent problem
given the expected returns, de¯ned as E[ ¹ Rd] = (1¡®d)Rd+®dR¤
d for deposits
and E[ ¹ Rl] = (1¡®l)Rl +®lR¤
l for loans. Note that the certainty equivalence
assumption allows us to solve this problem independently of the portfolio
composition decision. Hence the variance of returns does not a®ect the total
deposit or loan decisions6. The investor's j = H;L problem is
max
fD;Lg
(Y ¡ D + L)1¡1=¾
1 ¡ 1=¾
+ ¯j
(Y + E[ ¹ Rd]D ¡ E[ ¹ Rl]L)1¡1=¾
1 ¡ 1=¾
The fund manager allocates the deposits (D) and loans (L) determined by
the investor into foreign currency denominated deposits and loans (d¤;l¤) and
local currency denominated deposits and loans (d;l) to maximize expected
return and minimize the variance of the resulting portfolio, where
D = d + d
¤; d = (1 ¡ ®d)D and d
¤ = ®dD
L = l + l





E[ ¹ Rd] ¡ q




¹ Rd = (1 ¡ ®d) ^ Rd + ®d ^ R¤
d





ering that both are products that banks sell to households. However, deposit \demand"
is upward sloping as it represents a supply of funds.
6In the alternative speci¯cation shown in Appendix A these two decisions are made
together and therefore the total demand decisions are a®ected negatively by the variance.
12
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rate respectively by which the rate indexes need to be adjusted to get the
actual returns ( ^ Rd, ^ R¤
d) in period 2. These have zero mean, variances given
by S¼;¼, SS;S and covariance by S¼;S. Finally, q indicates the weight of the
variance term in the fund manager's objective function.




q(S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S)
+
S¼;¼ + S¼;S




q(S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S)
+ ¸MV P (2)
where, as in Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), ¸MV P a®ects dollarization posi-
tively and is de¯ned as
¸MV P =
S¼;¼ + S¼;S
(S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S)
The loans decision problem is similar to (1), though now fund managers
minimize the payment and the variance.
max
®l
¡E[ ¹ Rl] ¡ q




¹ Rl = (1 ¡ ®l) ^ Rl + ®l ^ R¤
l









q(S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S)
+
S¼;¼ + S¼;S




q(S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S)
+ ¸MV P (4)
The equations determining the portfolio choice are the same as in Ize and
Levy-Yeyati (2003). However, in their case ®d = ®l = ¸MV P as they assume
UIP holds. In our case banks choose interest rates such that households ¯nd
it optimal to increase ®l if loan di®erential (Rl¡R¤
l) increases and to decrease
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The aggregator sells deposit and loan indexes to households and buys indi-
vidual banks' deposits and loans from each bank in order to minimize the
cost for loans7 and maximize the gains for deposits8. We assume perfect
competition so the aggregator makes no pro¯ts. The introduction of a de-
posits and loans aggregator facilitates the exposition of the model without










subject to total deposits in local currency, which is a CES index of all deposits

















where rdi is the deposit rate given by bank i and the local currency deposit



























7The household promises to pay an interest rate for the loans (l), thus the aggregator
wants to pay as little as possible for the individual loans made in each bank i.
8The aggregator promises to pay a deposit rate to the household, thus he/she will want
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where rli is the loan rate set by bank i and the local currency loan rate index









Note that, again, pro¯ts are zero since
R 1
0 rlilidi = Rll.



















































i are bank i's foreign currency deposit and loan rates and
d¤
i and l¤
i are the demand for bank i's foreign currency deposits and loans.
R¤
d and R¤
l are the respective interest rate indexes.
2.3 Banks
Each bank i chooses deposit and loan interest rates for foreign and local
currency (rd¤
i;rl¤
i;rdi;rli) to maximize its expected second period pro¯ts and
its loan market shares.
15
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and its foreign liabilities, of which some are denominated in foreign currency
and some in local currency. Banks can use F to o®set loans, hence we do
not force the market of loans and deposits to match but allow banks to use
these funds to close the gap. The parameter Á indicates the portion of funds
that are denominated in foreign currency.
As foreign banks have greater facility to acquire funds in foreign currency
from their parent banks, greater foreign bank penetration can be expected
to result in a higher share of funds denominated in foreign currency. There-
fore foreign bank penetration is implicitly modelled here as Á. This link is
supported by our data (see section 4).
Banks are assumed to have balanced currency positions thus loans must
be equal to funds plus deposits for each currency.9 Given prudential regu-
lations limiting net open foreign exchange positions this assumption is not
unreasonable.


























subject to demand functions (5)-(8) and





i + ÁF (11)
where ° re°ects how much the bank cares about loan shares. We include
loan market shares in the banks' objective function for two main reasons.
Firstly, as shown by de Haas and Naaborg (2005), foreign banks do set tar-
gets for future market share for their subsidiaries in transition economies.
Secondly, given that we solve a two period model, loan market shares will
9If banks are not assumed to hold balanced currency positions but some limit is imposed
on currency exposures, the main qualitative results of the model remain unchanged as long
as this limit eventually binds given the sizes of F and Á.
10The second period realization of individual bank rates have the same risk components
de¯ned in the household problem, ¹¼ and ¹S (e.g. rli = E[rli] ¡ ¹¼). As banks are risk
neutral and these have zero mean, they do not a®ect bank i's problem.
16
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¯nite period model, assuming banks maximize the future stream of pro¯ts.
However, that would increase the complexity of the problem and since the
banking sector is growing considerably in these economies there is a premium
for ¯rst entrants that is not necessarily present in in¯nite period pro¯t func-
tions. In any case, the main qualitative results of our model do not change
when loan market shares are dropped from the banks' objective function.
The ¯rst order condition of the bank problem, incorporating the equilib-
rium conditions (individual bank rates are equal to rate indexes, explained
below) are: (10), (11) and
°µ ¡ L®l(Rd(1 + µ) + Rl(1 ¡ µ)) = 0
°µ ¡ L(1 ¡ ®l)(R
¤
d(1 + µ) + R
¤
l(1 ¡ µ)) = 0
2.4 Equilibrium




i=0, interest rate indexes fRd;R¤
d;Rl;R¤
lg and loan and de-
posit demands fd;d¤;l;l¤g such that given interest rates, aggregate demand
solves the households' problem, given aggregate demand and interest rate
indexes, the set frdi;rd¤
i;rli;rl¤
ig maximises bank i objective function for all













































11One can easily show that ensuring these, together with the individual bank demand
equations used as constraints to bank i's problem guarantees that the equations for
d;d¤;l;l¤ used in the aggregator problem hold.
17
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rate indexes are equal.
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Endogenous Foreign Funds
An extension to our basic model is to allow banks to choose the required
amount of foreign denominated funds given a pre-determined interest rate.
This is important since it allows us to verify if exogeneity of funds is driving
the results.
In addition this model extension is relevant because most foreign banks
have that facility open from their parent banks. Pro¯ts in transition economies
have generally been greater than in mature markets making this °ow of funds
a pro¯table strategy for the parent bank.
Hence bank i now starts with an amount of funds in local currency FLC


























subject to demand equations (5)-(8) and






As we will show in the next section, allowing for endogeneity of foreign
funds does not alter our main results.
12We implicitly assume that all external funds are denominated in foreign currency,
following the \original sin" literature.
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The basic model in this paper included only risk averse households who seek
to maximize the return and minimizing the variance of the loan/deposit
portfolio. However, corporate loan dollarization is also of interest. In fact,
as our data set shows, it is sizeable and generally higher than household loan
dollarization. Therefore, we now extend the model to include ¯rms which,
as is common in the literature, we will assume to be risk neutral.
We assume that a representative ¯rm has a project (investment oppor-
tunity) available, whereby investing V at period 1 the ¯rm will get MV at
period 2, where M is the real return on the project and is stochastic. We
further assume that the ¯rm has no funds in period 1 and hence is forced
to borrow the entire initial investment from banks. The ¯rm maximizes ex-
pected pro¯ts (Q) selecting the currency composition of the total amount
borrowed from banks given the interest rates on each loan type. Pro¯ts are
risky due to variations in M, in°ation (¹¼) and real exchange rate (¹S). We
assume these three stochastic processes are jointly normally distributed with









In order to make the portfolio currency selection non-trivial we assume
that the ¯rm may default if pro¯ts at period 2 are negative 13.









MV ¡ ¹ RvV;0
ª¤
where ¹ Rv = (1 ¡ ®v) ^ Rv + ®v ^ R¤
v





V = v + v
¤
v = (1 ¡ ®v)V
v
¤ = ®vV
13Under no default ¯rms would select the currency for which the loan interest rate is
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introduce a corporate loan aggregator or a syndicated loan manager. The
syndicated loan manager receives loan demands v and v¤ from the ¯rm and





























































If the ¯rm defaults the loan manager pays a cost of veri¯cation K and
gets M(v+v¤) from the ¯rm's project. In order to simplify bank i's problem
we assume that in case of a default the loan manager will charge Ki and K¤
i




net returns. This insurance mechanism is provided by a government agency
that e®ectively does a transfer for the loan manager to cover the gain or loss
given the realizations of M such that the net pro¯t of the loan aggregator is
zero. The insurance mechanism, or the transfer, is provided as long as the
loan manager's expected return without the transfer is not smaller than the
return he/she would get using the funds to make loans to the households
(assumed to be risk free), hence
E[minf ¹ RvV;MV g ¡ DefK] > V ¹ Rl: (14)
Where Def is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in case of default
and zero otherwise. Note that this constraint will actually bind in equilibrium
and is e®ectively a participation constraint for the loan manager to perform
the loan.
Given the participation constraint, the ¯rm problem can be modi¯ed as
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May 2007That implies that in order to maximize pro¯ts (Q) the ¯rm actually seeks
to minimize E[Def] or the probability of default. In the model presented by
Jeanne (2003) that would imply minimizing the variance since there, UIP
holds. In our case, as expected interest rate from local and foreign currency







where Q = (M ¡ (1 ¡ ®v) ^ Rv ¡ ®v ^ R¤
v)V
= (M + (1 ¡ ®v)¹¼ ¡ ®v¹S ¡ [(1 ¡ ®v)Rv + ®vR
¤
v])V:






(1 ¡ ®v)Rv + ®vR¤




Where © is the standard normal cumulative density function and ¾P
2 =
SM;M +(1¡®v)2S¼;¼ +®2
vSS;S ¡2(1¡®v)®vS¼;S ¡2®vSM;S +2(1¡®v)SM;¼.
The ¯rst order condition of this minimization is
R¤
v ¡ Rv
(S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S)
=
·
(1 ¡ ®v)Rv + ®vR¤
v ¡ ¹ M
¾p
¸³






First note that if Rv = R¤
v then the ¯rm will only minimize the variance
(min®v ¾p
2), hence ®v = ¸MV P + ¸COV. That way ¯rm loan dollarization is
determined by the original trade-o® between in°ation and the real exchange
rate (summarized by ¸MV P) plus an additional term re°ecting the optimal
hedging strategy of ¯rms as regards to the real return on their investments.
On the one hand, if the real return is positively correlated with the real
exchange rate then choosing foreign currency denominated loans protects
the ¯rm against default; higher interest payment will occur when investment
returns are high. Hence high SM;S leads to more dollarization.
On the other hand, if in°ation and real investment returns are negatively
correlated, then when in°ation is low and interest rate payments are high
the investment return will also be high, protecting the ¯rm against default.
Thus, lower SM;¼ leads to less dollarization.
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May 2007If R¤
v > Rv (assuming ¹ M ¡ (1 ¡ ®v)Rv ¡ ®v > 0 or the expected return
on investment is positive) then ®v < ¸MV P +¸COV ; corporate loan dollariza-
tion decreases. The ¯rm shifts the portfolio allocation towards the cheaper
loan type, which in this case is the one denominated in local currency. The
opposite occurs when R¤
v < Rv. Therefore, the ¯rm portfolio choice is very
similar to that of the households but for the new covariance term.
Finally, the introduction of ¯rms changes the bank problem as follows.
Each bank i uses total funds (deposits + F) to make loans for the represen-





























subject to demand functions (5)-(8), (12) and (13), and







i + ÁF (17)














Where the last two equations ((18) and (19)) are the participation con-
straints for each bank to take part in the ¯rm's syndicated loan, which can
also be written as
E[Net returnj no default]+E[Net returnjdefault] = E[Net return on household loan]:
Firstly note that since each bank i contributes with a small share of the
¯rm's loan they take the probability of default as given. Secondly, given our
assumption that Ki and K¤
i are set such that, in case of default, net return
for bank i is zero, the second term on the left hand side is zero. Hence, the
participation constraints can be written as
(1 ¡ ')(rvi ¡ 1) = (rli ¡ 1) and (1 ¡ ')(rv
¤
i ¡ 1) = (rl
¤
i ¡ 1)
14We set ° = 0.
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= probability of default.
The insurance mechanism introduced in the syndicated loan manager
problem clearly simpli¯es the bank's problem and will impact on the equi-
librium size of the ¯rm's credit spread. However, since the probability of
default is given for each bank i, this assumption will not change the qualita-
tive results of our model.
The ¯rst order conditions of the bank problem, simpli¯ed using the mar-

























3 Model Solution and Main Implications
In order to solve the model we assume the parameter values15 shown in Table
1. Discount factors are chosen to allow for a wider range of speci¯cations for
other parameters of the model for which the equilibrium rates are still within
the range [1=¯H;1=¯L]. Income (Y ) and ¾ are set to make sure that loan and
deposit demands are sensitive enough to interest rate changes. The model is
solved for di®erent values of F (smaller than 0:06), µ = 35 and ° = 0:00005,
which, given the other parameters, ensure the funds are never greater than
70% of total of deposits and banking spreads are around 7% (average in our
sample). Finally, we assume that ¸MV P = 0:516.
Table 1: Parameter Values
¯H ¯L Y ¾ µ ° ¸MV P
0.99 0.65 10 0.175 35 0.00005 0.5
Given that there has been a strong increase in foreign bank ownership ra-
tios (both in number of banks and percentage of assets) coupled with raises
15We have attempted to select plausible parameter values to match the observed data.
Nonetheless we are primarily concerned with the qualitative implications of the model.
16Where S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S = 0:1 and S¼;¼ + S¼;S = 0:05.
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May 2007in foreign liabilities in transition economies in the last ten years the main
question to be analysed with the model is how ¯nancial dollarization is im-
pacted by increases in the ratio of foreign denominated funds (Á) together
with an overall increase in total funds F.
Figure 1 shows the result of changing the amount of funds and the propor-
tion of funds in foreign currency for loans and deposits dollarization. When
both variables are increasing (top right corner of Figure 1(a) and 1(b)) the
foreign currency loans share (®l) increases and the foreign currency deposits
share actually decreases. Figures 1(c),1(e), and 1(d), 1(f) show the two
dimensional slices from the Figures 1(a) and 1(b), respectively, holding F
constant at high (0.06) and low (0.015) levels. If initial funds are high, banks
have more leverage resulting in more sensitivity on foreign currency shares
given a change in Á.
The fact that deposit dollarization is negatively a®ected by an increase
in Á might seem surprising at ¯rst. However, this can be explained by the
way banks are managing total funds (deposits plus F). If funds (F) are more
concentrated in foreign currency (Á increases) banks ¯nd it optimal to o®er
better rates on foreign loans, attracting more demand for these loans from
households. Households, therefore, decide to shift their portfolio towards
foreign currency loans but due to risk aversion still want some local currency
denominated loans. As a result, banks need a source of local currency funds
and o®er better deposit rates for domestic currency deposits, which, in turn
leads to a shift towards local currency in the households' deposit portfo-
lio. Hence the main implication from an increase in the proportion of funds
in foreign currency is that loan dollarization should increase while deposit
dollarization should decrease.
Note that when Á = 0:5, banks have no \preference" between foreign and
local currency loans and deposits, thus Rd = R¤
d and Rl = R¤
l, which implies
®d = ®l = ¸MV P = 0:5. Our model therefore nests the MV P framework of
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003).
Given that we obtain equilibrium rates for all the markets we can also
calculate interest rate di®erentials (local currency minus foreign currency
rates) for loans and deposits as well as margins (loan minus deposit rates)
for foreign and local currency.
Figure 2 shows that interest rate di®erentials increase as Á and F in-
crease. Hence there is a positive co-movement between loan di®erential and
loan dollarization and a negative co-movement between deposit di®erential
and dollarization. This is consistent with the bank's fund management rea-
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αd
(b) Deposit Dollarization










(c) Loan Dollarization - F = 0:06










(d) Deposit Dollarization - F = 0:06










(e) Loan Dollarization - F = 0:015










(f) Deposit Dollarization - F = 0:015
Figure 1: Loans and Deposits Foreign Currency Shares as Á increases
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(b) Deposit Di®erential
Figure 2: Interest Rate Di®erentials
soning. As banks make foreign currency loans and local currency deposits
more attractive both di®erentials increase (local currency loan and deposits
rates increase while foreign currency rates decrease). This induces house-
holds to take more foreign currency loans and make less foreign currency
deposits. Note that the relationship between interest rate di®erentials and
dollarizations is easily veri¯ed by looking at the fund manager's ¯rst order
conditions (equations (2) and (4)), since households will only deviate from
the ¸MV P if the di®erentials move.
The direction of the movements of loan and deposit dollarization and of
interest rate di®erentials as Á and F change are very robust across di®erent
parameterizations of the model. Movements in margins, however, depend on
the parametrization of the model. More precisely, they depend on the amount
of funds compared to deposits17, and on the degree of monopoly power of
banks18 compared with how much banks care about loan market shares (°).
Given that we have assumed that funds are always within a speci¯c range
below 70% of deposits the ¯rst condition is not relevant for our analysis.
If banks have low market power (µ) relative to how much they care about
market shares (°) then margin in foreign currency increases while margin in
local currency decreases as Á increases. The reason for this result is that as
° increases relative to 1/µ, the bank will be less willing to specialize in the
foreign market. Hence banks will not move loan rates apart as much as they
do for deposit rates leading to an increase in the foreign currency margin
and a decrease in local currency margin. The opposite happens when banks
17Implicitly given by F and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=¾.
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summarises the two cases.
Table 2: Margins when Á increases for di®erent parameter values
Case 1 - ° low relative to µ
Rl · increases more than Rd # Margin LC ", ®l " and ®d #
R¤
l ¸ decreases more than R¤
d " Margin FC #, ®l " and ®d #
Case 2 - ° high relative to µ
Rl " increases less than Rd · Margin LC #, ®l " and ®d #
R¤
l # decreases less than R¤
d ¸ Margin FC ", ®l " and ®d #
3.1 Model Extensions Results
3.1.1 Endogenous Foreign Funds - Results
The main implications of the model do not change if banks are free to choose
the amount of foreign funds. As ¯gure 3 shows when the external interest rate
EIB decreases and the amount of funds denominated in local currency (FLC)
decreases (bottom left hand corner), banks decide to increase the foreign
denominated funding (FFC or Foreign Liabilities) which leads to an increase
in loan dollarization and a decrease in deposit dollarization. This follows the


































































(c) Funds in For. Currency
Figure 3: Dollarization and Foreign Funds as external rate and local currency
funds increase
Interest rate di®erentials also move in the same fashion (Figure 4) as in
the basic model, higher di®erentials lead to more loan dollarization and less
27
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Diff_L F_LC = 0.025
(a) Loan Di®erential






Diff_D F_LC = 0.025
(b) Deposit Di®erential
Figure 4: Interest Rate Di®erentials - Endogenous Foreign Funds









Margin_FC F_LC = 0.025
(a) Margin in Foreign Currency Market









Margin_LC F_LC = 0.025
(b) Margin in Local Currency Market
Figure 5: Interest Rate Margins - Endogenous Foreign Funds
deposit dollarization. Interestingly both margins (Figure 5) now move in
the same direction, decreasing as foreign liabilities increase. This is so since
banks use foreign funds increasingly to supply the loan market without using
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An extra set of parameters values must be chosen in order to solve the model
with ¯rms. They are shown in Table 3. The variance of M (SM;M) is assumed
to be 33% higher than the variances of real exchange rate and in°ation, which
were assumed to be equal. The correlation of real returns and real exchange
rate (½M;S), and real returns and in°ation (½M;¼) are set to be equal to 0.4
and zero respectively. We will show how the model solution changes when
these are changed. The value of the mean of M ( ¹ M) was set such that the
probability of default is not greater than 20% across all our simulation and
V (initial investment) was set as the mean value of total funds F, which in
our simulation vary from 0.01 to 0.06.
Table 3: Additional Parameter Values
SM;M ½M;S ½M;¼ ¹ M V
0.04 0.4 0 1.6 0.03
We again analyze how ¯nancial dollarization (household loans, household
deposits and ¯rm loan (®v) dollarization) changes when the ratio of foreign
denominated funds (Á) increases together with an overall increase in total
funds F. Figure 6 shows the results. The same pattern as in the basic model
arises, loan dollarization for both ¯rm and household increase and deposit
dollarization decreases. Interest rate di®erential (not shown here) also moves
in the same fashion as in the basic model. Therefore the main implications of






































































Figure 6: Dollarization of Household and Firm Portfolios
Observe that when Á = 0:5 the ¯rm loan dollarization is 61% given that
¸COV = 0:11 and ¸MV P = 0:5 under the chosen parameter speci¯cation.
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May 2007Figure 7 shows that the ¯rm loan dollarization increases when the correlation
between investment real return and real exchange rate (½M;S) increases19,
as indicated by (15). Note that if both ½M;S and ½M;¼ are equal to zero,
then ¸COV equals to zero and share of foreign denominated loans equals
to ¸MV P = 0:5, reverting back to the solution of the household's portfolio
decision.








Figure 7: Firm Loan Dollarization and Correlation between investment re-
turn and real exchange rate
For economies with high degree of openness, a real depreciation of the
local currency leads to higher real output/investment return, or in other
words, greater the degree of openness higher the correlation between real
exchange rate and real output changes (high ½M;S). Hence, an additional
implication of the model when ¯rms are included is that higher degree of
openness leads to higher corporate ¯nancial dollarization as ¯rms use their
loan portfolio selection as a hedging strategy against default.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
Our analysis is based on a unique monthly data set compiled mostly from
national central banks for the panel of 24 transition economies (Table 29 in
the appendix). In line with the variables included in our theoretical model
and suggested by the literature we collected data for credit and deposits
denominated in foreign and domestic currency, and their respective interest




Working Paper Series No 748 
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between individuals and ¯rms, long term and short term FD. For some of
the countries we also obtained data for euro denominated credit and deposits.
The time series available are of varying length resulting in an unbalanced
panel. For some of the countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) no interest rate data is available or it is available only for loans but
not for deposits (Russia). After examining our data set we decided to use
data from January 2000 onwards to avoid the problem of dealing with the
e®ects of the Russian crisis.
We construct a measure of the share of foreign loans taking a ratio of
foreign currency denominated and total domestic credit. We calculate this
ratio for overall credit20, individuals and non¯nancial corporations (NFC).
The share of foreign currency denominated deposits is constructed in the
same fashion. All these measures are constructed using stock variables if
available. For countries where stock variables are not available, new business
loans and deposits are used (e.g. Albania).
To verify the implications of our theoretical model we calculate interest
rate di®erentials for loans and deposits (ir dif d and ir dif l), de¯ning the
di®erential as foreign currency interest rate minus the domestic currency
interest rate. In constructing this measure one year interest rates on the stock
values are used if available. If not available longer maturity or new business
measures are used. In case aggregate rates are not available, interest rates on
loans and deposits by NFCs are used as proxies. For a few countries in the
sample it is possible to distinguish between di®erentials faced by households
and NFCs.
In order to incorporate a measure of competitiveness and market structure
we calculate interest rate margins in local and foreign currency (margin lc
and margin fc). As in the model margins are de¯ned as the di®erence
between the loan and deposit rates in each currency.
Our model suggests that FD is also determined by ¸MV P which is de¯ned
as in Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003):
¸MV P =
S¼;¼ + S¼;S
S¼;¼ + SS;S + 2S¼;S
20This measure refers to households and ¯rms only. In some countries, however, a
broader measure was used, as it was not possible to exclude government and ¯nancial
institutions from domestic credit.
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May 2007where, S¼;¼ and SS;S are variances, and S¼;S is the covariance of in°ation and
change in real exchange rate.
While the minimum variance portfolio rationale may be true, it relies
on obtaining forward looking variances of in°ation and change in the real
exchange rate. As these are not observed, the most common alternative is
to use historical information to calculate variances. This practice, however,
introduces mismeasurement of ¸MV P, which may lead to wrong inference and
even rejection of the theory. Trying to overcome this di±culty we calculate
¸MV P estimating variances and covariances of in°ation and change in the
real exchange rate over varying period lengths and with respect to di®erent
currencies.
One could estimate variances over the whole sample period, but this would
introduce lookahead bias and make it impossible to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in our empirical analysis. Thus, as a compromise, we estimate
¸MV P based on all historical information up to the observation point21. The
change in the real exchange rate (S) is calculated as a percentage change in
the real exchange rate over the period of one year. In°ation is computed in
the same fashion, calculating the percentage change in the consumer price
index over one year.
As it can be seen from Table 7, the proportion of foreign currency loans
or deposits denominated in euro is quite signi¯cant. In addition, a number
of countries in the region have exchange rate regimes referenced to the euro.
Hence our focus is on the euro/local currency exchange rate, which is only
available since 1999. However, not accounting for pre 1999 exchange rate
variability risks losing information that agents may take into account when
forming expectations about future exchange rate variability. Therefore, we
are faced with the challenge of choosing the relevant exchange rate for the
pre 1999 period. For this period we estimate the variance of the change in the
real exchange rate using either the US dollar exchange rate (lambda mue)
or the Deutsche Mark exchange rate (lambda mde).
Note that for currency board countries the variability of real exchange
rate is directly linked to the variability of in°ation, thus if a currency board
is fully credible, ¸MV P is theoretically unde¯ned. In other words, there would
be no di®erence between local currency and foreign currency denominated
21Various other possibilities were investigated, estimating ¸MV P over various moving
window length (1 year, 2 years, etc.). After careful investigation it appeared that mov-
ing window methodology \forgets" periods of high variability and results in very volatile
estimates of ¸MV P.
32
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 748 
May 2007assets. However, as the observed returns are in fact di®erent these assets are
not the same. Hence one must decide how to estimate ¸MV P for currency
board countries. In what follows we calculate ¸MV P as for the other countries
relying on the small deviations of exchange rate due to transaction costs
and/or bid/ask spread movements.
One of the implications of our model is that increasing Á (proportion of
foreign currency denominated funds) leads to increasing loan dollarization
and decreasing deposit dollarization. To test this hypothesis we construct
an empirical counterpart of Á taking the ratio of foreign liabilities22 of banks
as a share of total funds net of deposits (i.e. foreign liabilities + capital).
Implicit is the assumption that all foreign liabilities are denominated in for-
eign currency, which is the case for transition economies. Since no consistent
measure of total bank capital is available we proxy it by assuming that the
actual capital adequacy ratio of the banking system in each country is bind-
ing. It has to be noted that regulatory capital may di®er from accounting
capital. The constructed variable is de¯ned as:
ratio =
foreign liabilities
foreign liabilities + total assets ¤ CAR
where CAR is the actual capital adequacy ratio of the banking system as
reported by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) and the accompanying data
set provided by the World Bank23.
While presenting our theoretical model we linked access to foreign funds
to the level of foreign bank penetration in the domestic banking local system.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) publishes
two indexes of foreign bank penetration, one measuring the percentage of
foreign ownership of total assets (sfb ta) and one measuring the number of
foreign owned banks (sfb nb). These are provided only yearly, and hence
can not be directly used in our empirical analysis. Nonetheless we found
a strong positive correlation between the level of foreign liabilities in the
banking sector and both measures of foreign bank penetration for almost all
the countries in our sample (see table 6).
22Note that all banks and bank-like institutions resident in a country are covered by
the banking sector survey used to measure foreign liabilities. Speci¯cally, \a subsidiary
unit of a non-resident principal is regarded resident of the economy in which its operations
are carried out" (International Monetary Fund (1984)), thus the mode of entry of foreign
banks (subsidiaries versus branches) do not a®ect the foreign liabilities measure.
23Accessible at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/bank regulation.htm.
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we found it positive for some countries and negative for others. On one hand,
as foreign banks enter into the local ¯nancial system, through privatization
or green¯eld direct investments, total capital in the banking sector increases
leading to an overall improvement of the banking system and a decrease in
ratio. On the other hand, foreign bank ownership leads to higher levels of
foreign liabilities, which in turn increases ratio. Therefore, the variable ratio
captures both e®ects of foreign bank penetration, higher levels of foreign
liabilities and higher capitalization of the banking sector.
As suggested by Barajas and Morales (2003) we also control for di®erent
exchange rate regimes by using a central bank intervention index that com-
pares the variabilities of international reserves and the exchange rate. The














where int res stands for international reserves, broad m for broad money and
er for local currency/euro exchange rate. The variable used in our empirical
analysis is smoothed taking the moving average over 12 months. A country
with low (high) variability in exchange rate and high (low) variability in in-
ternational reserves is said to have a de facto pegged (°oating) exchange rate
regime. Note that according to this measure a country with low variability
of exchange rate and low variability of international reserves is of \unknown"
exchange rate regime. It may be that the exchange rate is pegged and there
is little central bank intervention, or that the exchange rate is freely °oating
but is barely changing.
In our model ¯rm loan dollarization is shown to be dependent on how
open an economy is. Besides that, it is important to control for real dollar-
ization, which can be proxied by the openness of the economy. Hence we
also include openness, computed as the ratio of total imports and exports
compared to quarterly GDP (open =
imp+exp
GDP ), as an explanatory variable.
Finally, we control for di®erent levels of credit market development including
a market depth variable (depth), which is calculated as a ratio of domestic
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Figure 8 shows the variability and the median of dollarization over the sam-
ple period for every country. Shaded bars represent 25-75 percentile of ob-
servations, while vertical lines show the range of variation. The median is
denoted by a light line in the shaded bar. As can immediately be seen loan
and deposit dollarization are not exactly two sides of the same coin. There
are countries in our sample that have loan dollarization being higher than
deposit dollarization and vice versa. One can notice that there is a large
variation in dollarization for Serbia and Montenegro (CS) and Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BA). This is explained by the fact that in CS as of June 2006
around 80% of local currency loans had a foreign currency indexation clause
that linked repayments of principal and interest to the evolution of the di-
nar exchange rate.24 It is suspected that something similar is happening in
BA. Loan indexation is also prevalent in Croatia, but, we managed to obtain
indexation adjusted data for this country. As indexation adjusted data and
interest rate data for BA and CS are not available these countries will not
be included in our empirical analysis.
Over time FD is evolving quite di®erently across countries (Figure 9).
Loan dollarization is increasing in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia, while deposit dollarization in these countries is falling
with the exception of Latvia. It is also apparent that household loan dollar-
ization is lower compared to ¯rm dollarization (Table 4). This seems to be
true for all the countries except of Croatia and Latvia. Deposit dollarization,
though being higher for households in general, is very much country speci¯c.
Long term loan dollarization is prevailing, while there is no clear distinction
between short term and long term deposit dollarization (short term being
de¯ned as less than one year).
For several countries in our sample we are able to estimate the share of
foreign loans and deposits denominated in euro. The share of the euro among
foreign currency denominated loans is relatively high. With the exception
of Bosnia and Herzegovina euro loan denomination is more frequent than
deposit euro denomination (Table 7).
The step change in deposit dollarization that can be observed in FYR
Macedonia around January 2002 (Figure 9) can be explained by the euro
cash changeover e®ect. As high levels of euro legacy currency holdings had
to be exchanged to euro, some holdings were no longer held in cash \under
24\Survey of Banks Business Activities and Intentions" National Bank of Serbia
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May 2007Table 4: Loan and deposit dollarization across countries (total, individ-
ual/non¯nancial corporate, short term/long term, 2000-2006
Country ls tot ls ind ls nfc ls st ls lt ds tot ds ind ds nfc ds st ds lt
AL 0.68 . . 0.64 0.77 0.31 0.26 0.54 0.47 0.2
AM . . . . . 0.75 . . . .
AZ 0.62 . . 0.59 0.69 0.59 0.89 0.38 . .
BA 0.39 . . . . 0.52 . . 0.37 0.79
BG 0.41 0.08 0.54 0.42 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.46 0.5 0.4
BY . . . . . 0.57 0.51 0.63 0.59 0.56
CS 0.35 0.06 0.41 0.17 0.51 0.63 0.78 0.48 0.63 0.66
CZ 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.2 0.13 0
EE 0.8 0.68 0.8 0.6 0.82 0.3 0.19 0.42 0.29 0.41
GE 0.83 . . 0.75 0.91 0.94 . . 0.93 0.96
HU 0.35 0.13 0.39 . . 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.01
HR¤ 0.78 0.82 0.73 . . 0.65 0.79 0.36 . .
KZ 0.57 . . . . 0.51 0.6 0.44 . .
LT¤¤ 0.64 0.46 0.66 0.46 0.61 0.4 0.24 0.37 0.22 0.23
LV 0.61 0.65 0.59 . . 0.41 0.44 0.37 . .
MD 0.72 0.02 0.84 . . 0.5 . . . 0.5
MK 0.2 0.01 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.48 0.66 0.29 . .
PL 0.16 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.33 0.17 0.16 0.2 0.17 0.18
RO 0.59 0.29 0.62 0.52 0.69 0.44 0.74 . . .
RU 0.31 0.2 0.33 0.23 0.51 0.39 0.32 0.63 0.4 0.41
SI 0.25 0.02 0.34 0.2 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.21 0.35 0.25
SK 0.18 0.01 0.3 . . 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.39 .
TJ 0.7 . . . . 0.57 0.81 0.47 . .
UA 0.43 . . 0.35 0.53 0.35 . . 0.26 0.44
Total 0.47 0.21 0.47 0.35 0.51 0.44 0.46 0.39 0.4 0.42
Source: National Central Banks
¤ Adjusted for indexation
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May 2007Table 6: Correlation of ratio (1-2),foreign liabilities (3-4) and di®erent mea-
sures of foreign bank presence
Country sfb ta sfb nb sfb ta sfb nb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AL 0.9400 0.7512 0.9182 0.6865
AM -0.2201 -0.1636 0.7988 0.9236
AZ -0.4040 -0.0296 0.5166 0.7735
BA -0.9375 -0.9584 -0.6011 -0.6448
BG 0.7039 -0.2653 0.5422 0.3908
BY 0.8743 0.8743 0.9117 0.8870
CS -0.5649 -0.6833 0.0592 0.0079
CZ -0.2718 -0.1547 -0.0432 0.1129
EE 0.8610 0.8487 0.5376 0.7697
GE -0.0911 0.0928 0.7208 0.7372
HU -0.2277 -0.0528 0.3759 0.5745
HR 0.1806 -0.0915 0.6630 0.4568
KZ -0.1002 -0.9120 -0.2825 -0.6681
LT 0.8196 0.7829 0.6004 0.4912
LV 0.2590 0.4268 -0.3731 -0.2467
MD -0.2634 -0.6053 0.3621 0.6646
MK -0.1181 -0.2308 0.5741 0.4737
PL 0.8888 0.9114 0.8845 0.9463
RO 0.1753 0.2560 0.5398 0.5166
RU 0.7631 0.4543 0.1403 0.7664
SI 0.7598 0.8308 0.7438 0.8087
SK 0.2735 0.2891 0.4895 0.4743
TJ -0.2979 0.1361 -0.8437 0.9197
UA -0.2188 0.4730 0.4682 0.5811
Overall 0.2524 -0.0888 -0.0835 0.0820
Source: National Central Banks and EBRD
Table 7: Share of foreign loans and deposits denominated in euro, 2000-2006









Source: National Central Banks
38
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 748 
May 2007Table 8: Interest rate di®erentials (on loans and deposits) and interest rate
margins(in foreign currency and local currency), 2000-2006
Country ir dif l ir dif d margi fc margi lc
AL 6.30 4.95 5.49 6.83
AM 0.22 2.59 15.11 12.74
AZ -1.38 0.01 9.29 7.90
BA . . . .
BG 3.08 0.78 8.01 10.32
BY 5.92 16.16 . .
CS . . . .
CZ 0.91 -0.16 1.86 2.81
EE 2.12 0.07 2.24 4.04
GE 2.24 -3.44 12.07 17.76
HU 5.43 4.16 1.79 4.55
HX 4.14 1.10 1.83 7.57
KZ 3.23 0.87 9.23 11.59
LT 1.51 -0.31 3.42 5.35
LV 3.88 1.01 2.49 3.86
MD 11.17 12.23 8.43 7.37
MK 4.58 4.01 6.47 7.04
PL 5.33 2.37 3.80 6.76
RO 13.96 8.34 4.31 9.93
RU 5.33 . . 10.79
SI 3.07 1.78 2.90 5.17
SK 1.27 0.65 1.41 2.01
TJ 0.56 0.07 18.00 18.50
UA 11.72 3.10 6.89 15.51
Total 4.29 2.78 7.18 8.89
Source: National Central Banks
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Deposit dollarization Loan dollarization
Figure 8: Financial dollarization in transition economies, 2000-2006
the mattress" but rather were deposited in euro denominated accounts. This
is not observed for the other countries in our sample.
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May 20074.3 Methodology
Based on the existing literature and the implications of our theoretical model
we estimate the following model:
shareit = ¯1ratioit + ¯2¸it + ¯3ir difit + °marginit + ±macroit + ci + eit (20)
Where share stands for dollarization (loans or deposits), ratio is the pro-
portion of foreign currency denominated funds (as de¯ned above, and which
aims to capture foreign bank penetration), ir dif stands for the interest dif-
ferentials (loans and deposits) and margin stads for the interest rate margins
(local currency and foreign currency). Finally, macro stands for the follow-
ing macroeconomic controls: openness of the economy, exchange rate regime,
and ¯nancial depth. After examination (Hausman speci¯cation test) ¯xed
e®ects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Equation 20 is estimated via FGLS with panel heteroscedasticity and
panel speci¯c autocorrelation. Modi¯ed Wald test for groupwise heteroscedas-
ticity rejects the null of ¾2
i = ¾2 and partial autocorrelation function of the
error term dies out quickly justifying AR1 structure for the error term.
Endogeneity of interest rate di®erentials and margins may be suspected.
Formal endogeneity tests were not carried out due to the lack of proper
instruments. However, to account for possible endogeneity the model is esti-
mated using lagged values of interest rate di®erentials and margins. In any
case, estimation of the model based on the contemporaneous variables yields
qualitatively similar results.
Four speci¯cations of equation 20 are considered. First of all they di®er in
the way ¸MV P is calculated. In the ¯rst speci¯cation we use lambda mue.25
In the second speci¯cation lambda mde is used.26 The third and fourth spec-
i¯cations are estimated excluding currency board countries from the sample.
Tables 9 and 10 report regression results with the levels of dollarization
as dependent variables, while tables 11 and 12 report regression results with
the change in dollarization as a dependent variable. As our variables for FD
are calculated using stock measures they can not capture well the changes in
the dollarization of the new loans and deposits. Since the measures of new
business activity are not available we proxy it by looking at the changes in
the stock variables.
25Using the euro/local currency exchange rate since 1999 and the USD/local currency
exchange rate prior to 1999.
26Using the euro/local currency exchange rate since 1999 and the DEM/local currency
exchange rate prior to 1999.
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use of lambda mue and columns 7 through 12 correspond to the use of
lambda mde. In the odd columns of the tables we report estimation re-
sults where the dependent variable is loan dollarization, while in the even
columns we report results for deposit dollarization. Estimations are carried
out for total (columns 1-2 and 7-8), individual (columns 3-4 and 9-10), and
non¯nancial corporate dollarization (columns 5-6 and 11-12).
5 Estimation results
The main estimation results are reported in tables 9 through 12.
Share of funds in foreign currency
As predicted by the model, the share of funds in foreign currency (ratio)
has a positive impact on loan dollarization and a negative impact on deposit
dollarization. This result is very robust across speci¯cations. While ratio is
found to be very signi¯cant in explaining total and NFC loan and deposit
dollarization, it fails to explain loan dollarization by individuals.
Although we ¯nd that ratio has a positive e®ect on the change in loan
dollarization and a negative e®ect on the change in deposit dollarization by
individuals, overall signi¯cance of ratio explaining the change in dollariza-
tion is minimal. This lends support to the explanation that the level of
dollarization is dependent on the share of foreign funds, while the variability
around that level is not. This is in line with the view that increased foreign
bank presence in the region, by allowing banks to have greater access to for-
eign funds, has contributed to loan dollarization. Consistent with our model,
access to foreign funds leads to lower deposit dollarization.
Minimum variance portfolio dollarization
Estimation results con¯rm the theoretical argumentation of Ize and Levy-
Yeyati (2003), incorporated into our model, that the level of dollarization is
increasing with the increase in ¸MV P. This results is quite robust no matter
what measure of ¸MV P is being used. It must be noted, though, that the
coe±cient appears to be negative for household and ¯rm loan dollarization
(but not for total) when the currency board countries are included in the
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May 2007sample (Table 9 columns 3, 5, and 9). This artifact disappears if the cur-
rency board countries are dropped from the sample. As discussed above,
theoretically, ¸MV P is not de¯ned for currency board countries. It may be
argued that ¸MV P should be dropped in case currency board countries are
included, but then the model is misspeci¯ed with respect to non currency
board countries. Tables 19 and 20 in the appendix show that the exclusion
of ¸MV P in the regressions with currency board countries does not alter the
qualitative results.
We also ¯nd that lambda mue has a positive impact on the change in loan
dollarization for all sectors of the economy. This holds both for the whole
sample and when the currency board countries are dropped suggesting that
minimum variance portfolio argumentation is also relevant in explaining new
loan dollarization.
Interest rate di®erentials
The estimation results suggest that interest rate di®erentials in°uence the
currency composition of loans and deposits. Interest rate di®erentials have
better explanatory power on changes in dollarization as compared to its level.
Estimation with the change in dollarization as a dependent variable yields
consistent results for all the speci¯cations. The interest rate di®erential on
loans has a positive e®ect on loan dollarization, while the interest rate di®er-
ential on deposits has a negative e®ect on deposit dollarization. This is in line
with the predictions of the model and appears to be the case for households
and ¯rms.
Analyzing the impact of interest rate di®erentials on the level of FD,
we ¯nd that deposit dollarization of the individuals and ¯rms is a®ected
by interest rate di®erential. It is higher when interest rate di®erential on
deposits is lower (Table 9 and 10). This is also consistent with our model.
The fact that interest rate di®erentials have almost no impact on the
level of dollarization may be explained by the way we measure it. The
share of foreign currency denominated loans and deposits being used in our
estimation is calculated from the stock variables, which naturally responds
less to interest rate di®erentials. Therefore, it is expected that interest rate
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The prediction of our model is that relation of margins to dollarization de-
pends consistently on the parametrization of the model. In case banks care
a lot about the loan market share relative to their market power, foreign
currency margin and loan dollarization move in the same direction, while
local currency margin moves in the opposite direction (as share of funds in
foreign currency changes). This would predict a positive sign on margin fc
and a negative sign on margin lc in explaining loan dollarization. Signs for
deposit dollarization should be reversed.
However, empirical results on margins explaining the level of dollarization
do not lend consistent support to the model implications. Increasing domes-
tic margins seem to be decreasing loan dollarization, but this result is not
robust if currency board countries are excluded from the sample. Margins
on foreign currency (margin fc) appear to have weak predicting power or
yield contradicting results.
In the regressions with the change in dollarization as the dependent vari-
able margins appear to have higher explanatory power. Local currency mar-
gin decreases loan dollarization (as is predicted by the model in case 2).
Deposit dollarization though, increases with margin fc (opposite of case 2).
One rationalization of this result is that in reality banks care not only
about loan market share (as is modeled), but also about deposit share. Thus,
as the deposit market share becomes important, increasing domestic (foreign)
margins should decrease (increase) dollarization of deposits (as is con¯rmed
by regression results in Table 11 and 12).
This result can also be rationalized by the fact that in these economies
bank market power is comparatively high and banks are increasingly do-
ing business in the currency with higher return. If local currency margin
increases, dollarization of deposits and loans decreases, while increasing for-
eign currency margin has the opposite e®ect.
Macroeconomic conditions
In speci¯cations with the level of FD as the dependent variable openness
of the economy is found to be increasing deposit dollarization, while at the
same time it is decreasing loan dollarization. If the currency board countries
are dropped from the sample openness looses signi¯cance in explaining loan
dollarization. However, openness has a positive impact for corporate loan and
45
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 748 
May 2007deposit dollarization with and without the currency board countries. This
con¯rms the implication of our model with ¯rms and furthermore indicates
that real dollarization contributes to FD.
The central bank intervention index (interv) has mostly no explanatory
power. For the few speci¯cations where this variable is signi¯cant it seems
to have a negative impact on deposit dollarization.
Despite the fact that more interventions would lead to less variability
in foreign exchange rate and therefore a shift towards dollarization, ¸MV P
is already capturing that e®ect as argued by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003).
Hence the extra explanatory power of interventions could be coming from
the increased con¯dence in local currency. This can be con¯rmed by the
fact that when ¸MV P is excluded from the regression, intervention looses its
signi¯cance (Table 19 and 20).
The signs of credit market depth (depth) coe±cient seem to match with
the signs of the coe±cients of the ratio variable (positive for loans and nega-
tive for deposits). That leads us to conclude that domestic credit growth in
transitional economies is mostly driven by the in°ux of foreign funds (through
the increase in foreign liabilities).
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Table 13: Sensitivity analysis of country by country exclusions




































gains signi¯cance LT SI SK
We test the robustness of our results in a number of di®erent ways. First,
we used two di®erent measures of ¸MV P and, as discussed, results are robust
across these two measures. Second, we estimated the model with and without
the currency board countries, which produced very similar results with the
only exception of ¸MV P.
Thirdly, because of better small sample properties we reestimate all of
the above speci¯cations of the model via OLS with heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation robust errors. OLS estimation results are presented in the
appendix in Tables 15 and 18. The main qualitative results do not change.
Note that, when explaining the level of household dollarization, interest rate
di®erentials have the opposite sign compared to the model predictions, al-
though impact on the change in dollarization remains the same.
Fourthly, we reestimate the empirical model for total dollarization of de-
posits and loans (column 1 and 2 in Tables 9 and 11) dropping one country
at the time from the sample. None of the estimated parameters reverse signs,
although some loose signi¯cance, while others gain. We report in Table 13
countries for which their exclusion leads to these changes.
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same results are obtained when regressing on the contemporaneous variables
(Tables 21 to 28 in the Appendix).
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a model to explain the determinants of ¯nancial dol-
larization. Implications of the model are empirically veri¯ed using a newly
compiled data set on transition economies. We ¯nd that dollarization of de-
posits is not generally matched by the dollarization of credit in contrast with
the model predictions of Ize (2005). For some countries in our sample credit
dollarization is higher than deposit dollarization and vice versa.
The richness of our data set, split by households and ¯rms as well as long
term and short term, allows us to explore ¯nancial dollarization in great
detail. We observe that household credit dollarization is lower compared to
corporate dollarization, which might be comforting knowing that households
usually have less hedging capabilities.
An important distinction between households and ¯rms is that a country's
openness to the international economy is contributing to corporate but not to
household ¯nancial dollarization, supporting the real dollarization paradigm.
Note that the explanatory power of our model is generally lower for household
vis-a-vis total and corporate dollarization. Hence, this framework does not
seem to capture all the main determinants of household dollarization and
more research is needed in this area.
We also ¯nd that long term credit dollarization is generally higher than
short term credit dollarization. While short term credit dollarization carries
an increased risk of combining currency and maturity mismatches, the ex-
change rate risk per se is higher in the case of foreign currency long-term
credit. This could be regarded as a potential vulnerability, as shocks to the
exchange rate are expected to be more likely over a longer time span.
Our analysis nests the minimum variance portfolio framework. In line
with previous studies, the trade o® between in°ation and real exchange rate
variability is found to be a signi¯cant factor explaining ¯nancial dollarization.
One of the main features of transition economies is the increasing presence
of foreign banks and the consequent in°ux of foreign funds. According to
our model, as well as the empirical results, access to foreign funds increases
credit dollarization although it decreases dollarization of deposits. This could
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countries, leading to higher credit risk (due to exchange risk) and a more
fragile ¯nancial system. Thus, de-dollarization of credit could possibly be
achieved by implementing controls on accumulation of net foreign liabilities
in the banking sector. Note that even when credit and deposit dollarization
are matched at the aggregate level, there may be currency mismatches in the
economy.
If uncovered interest rate parity holds then any interest rate di®erential
that is observed on domestic and foreign currency denominated assets should
be explained by an expected depreciation or appreciation of the currency.
Thus, interest rate di®erentials should not a®ect the currency composition
of loans and deposits.
In contrast with the literature we allow for uncovered interest rate parity
not to hold necessarily, hence the interest rate di®erential can play a part.
Matching the implications of the model, our empirical results show that a
higher interest rate di®erential on loans increases credit dollarization. On the
other hand, deposit dollarization decreases when the interest rate di®erential
on deposits increases. Hence interest rate di®erentials matter.
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An alternative speci¯cation of our model is when households choose at once
the set (D;L;®d;®l), where D = total deposits, L = total loans, ®d = por-
tion of deposits in foreign currency (deposit dollarization) and ®l = portion of
loans in foreign currency (loan dollarization), instead of splitting the house-
holds into investors and fund managers. The other agents face the same
problems.
We assume households maximize a Kreps-Porteus/Epstein-Zin utility func-
tion allowing us to distinguish intertemporal elasticity of substitution(¾) and
degree of risk aversion (´) subject to period 1 and 2 budget constraints.



















Y = C1 + D ¡ L

















D = d + d
¤; d = (1 ¡ ®d)D and d
¤ = ®dD
L = l + l
¤; l = (1 ¡ ®l)L and l
¤ = ®lL
where ¹ Rd and ¹ Rl are the deposit and loan interest rates given by the weighted
average of their respective rate indexes (formally de¯ned in the aggrega-
tor problem), (d;l) are the local currency denominated deposits and loans,
(d¤;l¤) are the foreign currency denominated deposits and loans and p2 and
e2 are price and real exchange rate at period 2, which are stochastic (period
one price and exchange rate are equal to 1). Main variables of interest are
®d (deposit dollarization) and ®l (loan dollarization).
The algorithm to solve this speci¯cation of the model with a single house-
hold unit is very computationally intensive and therefore its solution for only
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Alternative Speci¯cation Main Speci¯cation
Á = 0:5 Á = 0:525 Á = 0:5 Á = 0:525
D 0.1095 0.109475 0.118977 0.118978
®d 0.5 0.4940 0.5 0.495743
L 0.1595 0.1595 0.168977 0.168978
®l 0.5 0.504 0.5 0.5045
Rd 1.1670 1.1675 1.17056 1.17077
R¤
d 1.1670 1.6640 1.17056 1.17034
Rl 1.2350 1.2355 1.23880 1.23902
R¤
l 1.2350 1.2343 1.23880 1.23858
Á = 0:5 and Á = 0:525 are presented. The same parameter values shown in
table 1 were used.
In addition we assume that ´ = 10, making sure di®erences in variances
and rates lead to portfolio diversi¯cation and that there are four possible
states: both price and exchange rates are high (ph = 1:75,eh = 1:4285) with
probability 0.4, both price and exchange rate are low (pl = 0:7,el = 0:5715)
with the same probability and the other two when one variable takes its high
value and the other its low value, both with a probability of 0.1.
We then calculate the equilibrium of the model using the following grid
search problem. Given a list of four rate indexes the household problems are
solved obtaining the aggregate demands. We then solve the bank problem
using the rate indexes and aggregate demands. The equilibrium rates are
obtained when the rates chosen by the banks are equal to the four rate
indexes. If no rate is found we increase the granularity of the grids.
Table 14 shows the results for both speci¯cations of the model. Both
showed the same patterns, as Á increases loan dollarization and interest rate
di®erentials increase while deposit dollarization decreases. Note that L and D
are always lower in the alternative speci¯cation due to precautionary motive
when variances are considered into the loans and deposits demand decision.
Recall that due to the certainty equivalence assumption variances are not
considered in that decision in the main speci¯cation of the model.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina BA
Bulgaria BG
Belarus BY


















¤ HX for indexation adjusted
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